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Abstract 
  
This paper examines the crucial role that migration brokers play in organizing and 
sustaining irregular migration from Ethiopia to South Africa. Brokers and smugglers 
assist migrants in circumventing layers of migration control and navigate the complex, 
risky mobility landscape in the context of the governments’ organized campaign to 
stop ‘illegal migration’. The existing bodies of literature pertaining to irregular 
migration in Ethiopia suffer from major limitations. First, they tend to reduce the 
complex processes of overland migratory exits from Ethiopia to narratives of human 
trafficking. Secondly, they are devoid of the perspectives of migrants and brokers 
about the role of migration intermediaries even though their roles are indispensable 
where official migration channels are inaccessible. Thirdly, there is also a tendency to 
ignore the ambiguity of the boundaries between migration facilitation and the domain 
of migration control. Based on our research in major migrant sending locations— 
Hadya in Southern Ethiopia and the transit town of Moyale on the Ethiopia-Kenya 
border— this paper examines the multifaceted actors, their roles and infrastructures 
that facilitate and condition the migration process. More specifically, we examine the 
interplay between the complex web of migration facilitation, migrants’ agency and 
the control regimes to show how Ethiopian migration facilitation functions and how 
migrants navigate this complex landscape.  
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Executive Summary 
 
This working paper discusses the key roles that brokers and smugglers play in helping 
Ethiopian migrants heading to South Africa in circumventing layers of migration 
control. They assist migrants in navigating complex, risky landscapes that have 
emerged in the context of the Ethiopian government’s organized campaign to stop 
‘illegal migration’. Our data challenges the prevalent hegemonic official narratives 
that reduce migration facilitation to individual acts of human traffickers. Rather, it 
highlights multiple actors, complex processes and infrastructures of migration. 
Furthermore, instead of portraying migrants as silent victims of various kinds of abuse, 
the paper emphasizes the active participation of the migrants, their families and their 
communities in the migration facilitation. Specifically, the paper discusses how 
brokers/smugglers organize departures, transportation arrangements, money 
exchange and transfer services, crossing borders and setting up reliable networks and 
routes through transit points and up to specific destinations.   
The paper departs from the dominant literature on human smuggling and trafficking 
by present-ing an alternative approach to understanding migration facilitation from 
the perspectives of mi-grants and migration facilitators at the places of origin and the 
first border crossing. The data was collected over three months of fieldwork 
conducted between March and December 2018 in Hadya and Moyale, origin and 
transit respectively. We interviewed and held Focus Group Dis-cussions with aspiring 
migrants, deportees, returnees, families of migrants, informal brokers, law 
enforcement officials, border guards, immigration officials, officials of international 
organ-izations and local NGOs.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of “assemblages” is used to analyse how 
various actors come together at different nodes of the journey to respond to shifting 
policy environments. Contrary to the statist top-down view, brokerage is socially 
embedded and is part of the every-day lives of the community. Kinship networks, 
customary elders, church leaders, ordinary peo-ple and local officials play important 
roles in facilitating migrants’ departures from Hadya.   
In the borderlands of Moyale, smugglers have successfully changed migration into a 
community enterprise by involving unemployed youth, under-paid civil servants, 
drivers, cross-border traders, workers in hotels, religious institutions, immigration 
officials and border guards. These are assembled due to their common interest – 
supporting the migrants’ mobility. However, internally, their interests vary from 
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financial gains to loyalty based on social relations such as ethnicity, religion, language 
and belonging to a certain locality.   
Communication technologies play key roles in holding the networks together and 
transferring money. Ethiopian smugglers from the border town of Moyale follow up 
their clients’ mobility across South-eastern African countries and avail resources, 
when necessary, by exploiting the communication technologies and money transfer 
agencies. Accessibility to Kenyan mobile phones and money transfer agencies in 
Moyale, that operate across Southeast African countries, is crucial for the brokers and 
smugglers as migration facilitation requires urgent interventions in cases of potential 
risks en route.  Thus, Ethiopians irregular migration to South Africa has been shaped 
by the involvement of complex social relations, access to communication 
technologies, money transfer services and flow of information. 
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Introduction 
 
“…the broker was called Dagim… He is Hadya [ethnically] but used to live in Addis 
Ababa. I know his brothers and their village. I contacted him through my cousin who 
lives in South Africa. I gave him a call and met him in person. He has supported so many 
Hadya [to emigrate]. He even helped some deportees to try once or twice again without 
demanding additional payment from them… My elder brother negotiated the 
brokerage fee and paid half of it on the spot and agreed to deposit the remaining half 
with a shop owner who is familiar to both of them… Dagim told us to “get online” [a 
code phrase for taking a bus to Moyale]. We were 24 people when we arrived in Moyale 
where his people received us… In those days the journey was relatively smooth, and the 
cost was relatively small. I paid only 28,000 birr [currently equivalent to 1000 USD]… It 
took us only two weeks to reach Malawi. But, Malawi was a very difficult country to 
cross where many ‘boys’ were caught. The broker who received us in Malawi was very 
smart. He was a Somali, and his assistant was from Hadya… He put us in a refugee 
camp for over one month. We were registered in the camp… Then, one day we were 
called by the broker to leave the camp and he told us that everything was arranged 
very well for our journey to South Africa.”— Interview with Dawit, a returnee from 
South Africa 
The above quotation is a recollection from Dawit, who was a returnee from the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA) and now running a cafe in Hadya. He narrated the story of his own 
migration trajectory, which exemplifies the organization of exits and the journey including 
the infrastructures of migration. In the face of precarious socioeconomic and political 
conditions that deprive younger people of life chances, compounded by limited opportunities 
for legal migration paths, a vast majority of Ethiopians— mainly low skilled young men and 
women— opt for overland exits. These journeys involve dangerous and long trails across 
deserts, difficult terrains and seas until they arrive in Europe, the Middle East, the RSA or 
other destinations (RMMS, 2014a; 2014b; Kubai, 2016; Ayalew, 2017b). 
 
There are three major overland routes of irregular migration from Ethiopia: the eastern route 
(to the Middle East and the Gulf States through Djibouti and Somalia via Yemen), the southern 
route (to South Africa via Eastern and Southern African countries, which is the focus of this 
paper) and the north-western route (to Italy/Europe via the Sudan and Libya and to Israel via 
Egypt).  
 
Migrants accomplish long overland journeys through collective, accumulated and improvised 
forms of knowledge and resources that are acquired, developed and shared by those in 
transit and their communities. In addition, research reports and anecdotal information 
suggest that various types of formal and informal brokers known in local parlance as delala 
(pl. delaloch) arrange specific transport services and other facilities of mobility to cross 
borders, deserts and seas (ILO, 2011; Ayalew, 2017; Fernadez, 2017). In other words, risks of 
migration are mediated and journeys are organized through the entanglement of 
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transnational social and brokers’ networks, the use of diverse mobility routes, 
communication technology (e.g. mobile phones) and informal money transfer institutions. 
  
There is a growing body of research on migration in Ethiopia. However, common 
shortcomings of the extant research are: (1) reducing the complex processes of migratory 
exits from Ethiopia to simple narratives of human trafficking (see Abebebaw, 2013; Triulzi and 
Mckenzie, 2013; Hailemichael, 2014; Habte, 2015; Shewit, 2015; Zeyneba, 2016); (2) 
portraying migrants as silent victims of various kinds of abuse including sexual abuse, forced 
labour and physical abuse by trafficking rings and smuggling operations (see also Fernandez, 
2010; Guday and Kiya, 2013; Asnake and Zerihun, 2015; Grabska, 2016; Zeyneba, 2016); (3) 
eliding the perspectives of migration brokers/intermediaries, aspiring migrants and their 
household members who are key stakeholders in the migrant’s mobility.  
 
This paper aims to explore the role of migration facilitation in organizing migratory 
departures from Ethiopia, crossing multiple state borders, towards the RSA. With a focus on 
migration facilitation at places of origin and transit, we challenge the criminalizing and 
individualizing tendencies inherent in hegemonic official narratives that reduce migration 
facilitation to individual acts of human traffickers. Instead, we highlight multiple actors and 
examine complex collective practices of mobilization. However, it would be difficult to 
understand the workings of the migration facilitation without paying attention to the 
migration control and the humanitarian industry (cf. Xiang and Lindquist, 2014). Therefore, 
our intention is to examine how these ‘subcategories’ work together and how migrants 
navigate the complex and risky landscape of control, facilitation and regulatory 
infrastructures. Understanding this situation necessitates seeing the role of brokerage as an 
entry point to the wider organizational logic of migration rather than narrowing it to the 
relationship between brokers and migrants (Alpes, 2013). This includes understanding the 
modus operandi of brokers/smugglers interactions with the multiple actors and how they 
adapt to very dynamic socio-cultural, political, and economic situations. It further involves 
understanding of how they facilitate departures, transportation arrangements, money 
exchange and transfer services, crossing borders and setting up reliable networks and routes 
up to destinations.   
Methodology 
 
The data discussed in this paper are drawn from the ongoing research on the migration 
industry in Ethiopia, which is part of the UK Aid funded Migrating out of Poverty (MOOP) 
Research Programme Consortium. The study was conducted in three major migrant origin 
locations (Addis Ababa, Hadya and Wollo) and three transit towns near borders with other 
countries (Desheto, Metema and Moyale). The empirical data for this working paper was 
gathered mainly from Hadya and Moyale- as the place of origin and transit for migrants 
heading south towards RSA.  
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Perspectives from Hadya, explain the organization of migration at origin, the personal and 
social relationships and expectations between aspiring migrants, their families, brokers and 
other intermediaries. They further explain the community’s perception about the brokers and 
the mode of money transfers. The border town of Moyale is very crucial as it is the first transit 
for the migrants’ over land journey from Ethiopia to the Republic of South Africa. It is where 
migrants, for the first time, experience and circumvent multiple barriers including border 
control agencies such as border guards and immigration officials. Border transit towns are 
also where we see different “assemblages” of migration facilitation actors compared to the 
place of origin. We discuss the theoretical underpinnings of migrant assemblages in the 
conceptual section below. 
 
The data was collected over three months of fieldwork conducted between March and 
December 2018 in Hadya and Moyale. We interviewed and held Focus Group Discussions with 
aspiring migrants, deportees, returnees, families of migrants, informal brokers, law 
enforcement officials, border guards, immigration officials, officials of international 
organizations and local NGOs. These include six brokers, two border guards, 16 
officials/personnel working in migration related government offices and three NGOs/ 
international organizations engaged in migration management activities. In addition, 25 
aspiring migrants including deportees, 23 families/households of migrants, 20 returnees and 
3 migrants en route were interviewed.  
Conceptualizing migration facilitation 
 
Figure 2  Map showing overland migration routes Figure 1  Sea route from the Horn of Africa to South Africa 
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In the 1990s, the notion of the migration industry was introduced into the field of migration 
studies to understand how migration flows sustained themselves despite increased state 
efforts to close their external borders and stem immigration flows.  Following the pioneering 
work of Salt & Stein (1997), migration scholars have sought to explain the role of mediating 
actors and processes involved in border controls and those facilitating contemporary 
irregular labour and refugee mobility, particularly from the Global South to the Global North 
(Hernandez-Leon, 2008; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013; Andersson, 2014). 
Hernandez-Leon (2008) promulgates the concept of migration entrepreneurs which include 
service providers arranging travel, legal services, smuggling operations and documents 
necessary for clandestine mobility. Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen broaden the discussion 
of the migration industry to encompass ‘service providers’ who facilitate migration, including 
human smuggling and trafficking networks, transnational criminal organizations and 
trafficking rings, as well as ‘control providers’ such as private contractors performing 
immigration checks, operating detention centres and/or carrying out forced returns (2013: 1-
19). Their study emphasized that these various actors maximize and accumulate huge 
economic gains by capitalizing on migrants’ desire to move and the states’ increasing efforts 
to manage migratory mobility. 
Drawing on Hernández-León’s (2009) notion of the migration industry, they pointed out that 
the migration industry ‘greases the engines of international migration’ by providing and 
articulating the expertise and infrastructural resources needed for cross-border movements.  
 
The strength of the migration industry metaphor in irregular migration facilitation theory is 
that it enhances our understanding of migration as a multi-level process involving different 
actors. For instance, Salt and Stein’s (1997) business model interestingly demonstrates how 
migration facilitators such as brokers play key roles in three stages of migration: ‘mobilizing’ 
exits from homelands, facilitating transitions ‘en route’ and ‘inserting and integrating’ in the 
destination country. However, their approach has since been critiqued for portraying brokers 
mainly as profit maximising actors with little attention to the reciprocity of the arrangement 
as we argue below. In this paper we focus on the first two aspects of brokerage that Salt and 
Stein highlight: the dynamics of migrants’ exits from source areas and the way in which 
migrants manage the first major transit in their migration trajectory.  
 
Early research on the economics of the migration industry emphasized the entrepreneurship 
and business dimensions of facilitating mobility. However,  it paid little attention to migrants’ 
subjective energy and agency in mobilizing migration resources, non-profit factors such as 
social and family obligations that complement the organization of migratory trajectories and 
the dynamic relationships that emerge between migrants and brokers (Herman, 2006: 217; 
Sanchez, 2015). Moreover, the manner in which migrants and brokers create and use 
networks by capitalizing on shared nationality, ethnicity, religion and origin during organizing 
clandestine migratory journeys is overlooked. For instance, brokering practices in the 
contemporary Ethiopian migration facilitations and pathways to the RSA that we are 
discussing here are embedded in and complemented by the entanglement of local socio-
cultural norms and cross-border social and brokering networks.  
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The types of actors in the migration industry and the multifaceted interweaving between 
them is extremely dynamic and complex. In this paper using brokers/smugglers as the entry 
point, we discuss how different actors “assemble” to facilitate migrants’ departure, mobility 
and border crossing. We draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages to 
understand the functioning of the migration industry and how different actors within it relate 
to each other and how they respond to particular constraints and opportunities created by 
policy, resource availability and networks. As Wise (2013) points out, the term assemblage 
must be understood as a verb— the process of arranging, organizing and fitting together or 
that which is being assembled. Marcus and Saka underscore its importance in allowing 
researchers to examine the emergence of heterogenous groupings in an “ephemeral in 
nonetheless ordered social life” (2006: 101) while Anderson and McFarlane (2011) argue that 
assemblages are a way of thinking about particular socio-spatial formations that come 
together for a united purpose.  
 
In Ethiopia, “assembling” is done by migration facilitators, the migration control industry and 
the humanitarian industry, who have their own specific objectives which are often conflicting 
but also interestingly, as Schapendonk (2018: 665) argues, play overlapping roles to shape 
migrants’ mobility. Therefore, to understand migration facilitation we examine the interplay 
of migrants, brokers/smugglers, hawala agencies and multiple migration control structures 
at different levels and how different actors are brought together. The international 
organizations that provide humanitarian support and facilitate deportations are also part of 
the industry (cf. Schapendonk, 2018: 665). We explore how brokers play the major role in 
enabling these “complex web of relations in which different actors liaise” (see also 
Schapendonk, 2018: 663) and shape migration from Ethiopia to the Republic of South Africa.  
Migrants’ desire to migrate and their active participation in selecting and paying the brokers 
make them “active constituents of these assemblages” (Collins, 2018: 978). The assemblage 
is a dynamic process that continuously embraces or leaves out actors depending on contexts.  
    
In Ethiopia, multiple layers of brokers, transporters, employers, ordinary residents and 
hawala agents engage in selecting, housing, transporting, protecting, facilitating the access 
of foreign currencies and helping migrants cross several checkpoints and state borders. 
Migration control actors include the anti-human trafficking command post, police officers 
working at checkpoints, and border guards that are organized and placed along the main 
migration routes to prevent irregular migrants’ mobility and target smuggling networks. The 
humanitarian industry such as International Organization for Migration (IOM), support the 
deportation process of apprehended migrants at the border and en route in several countries 
by providing transportation and the necessary finance to take them back to their place of 
origin. For these purposes, the IOM has opened offices in major migration transit border 
areas. This indicates complex migration industry actors and infrastructures that are 
differently configured and function in a particular migration context. 
 
However, these three major migration industry actors— the facilitators, the controllers, and 
the humanitarian actors— shift their roles and blur their boundaries (Cf. Schapendonk, 2018: 
665). In these changing roles, administration and immigration officials and border guards 
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work both against and with the migration facilitators. In fact, the crucial role and success of 
a broker is evaluated not only through his/her relationship with the migrants but mainly in 
how effectively they work with the migration control structure. The same migration control 
actors work with the humanitarian industry on their mission to control mobility. This shows 
the extent of the heterogeneity of the domain of the state where some actors and institutions 
enforce the regulatory instruments in place while others reinforce migration facilitation 
(Alpes, 2011). For example, in major border towns of Ethiopia, including Moyale, the police 
and border guards hand over the apprehended migrants to the IOM office for humanitarian 
aid and support in the deportation process. The IOM provides sheltering services to the 
migrants and gives them a small amount of money to cover their travel expenses to go back 
home.  
 
Contemporaneously and contrarily, brokers and smugglers also try to make use of the 
humanitarian industry whenever possible. For instance, many Ethiopian smugglers are 
registered in the refugee camps in Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique so that they can use their 
refugee status to situate themselves in this migration space. The smugglers also help migrants 
en route to be registered and hosted at the refugee camps in the situation of uncertainties in 
their journey until they monitor the route.  The above discussion indicates how contemporary 
clandestine migration is informed, conditioned and mediated by various dimensions of 
migration infrastructures.   
 
The contexts and conditions of Ethiopian migration to South Africa 
 
Risky border crossings and long journeys of Ethiopian migrants need to be situated in the 
context of the social and political economy. In the face of increasing uncertainties in Ethiopia 
– expressed, for instance, in limited life choices, volatile politics and precarious economic 
conditions particularly for young people – a large number of Ethiopians find themselves in 
desperate situations (Girmachew, 2018; Ayalew, 2017).  
 
Ethiopian youth are dissatisfied by growing economic inequalities, long years of repressive 
political conditions and environmental challenges. At the same time, they are lured into 
migration influenced by perceived diasporic remittances or “returnees’ prosperity”, and 
driven by social and familial expectations. Positive images about migration and the diaspora 
often circulate in family narratives, popular culture, and state policies in Ethiopia (Ephrem, 
2011; Ayalew, 2017). It is in this context that young people begin to look at migration as a 
window of opportunity through which personal, family and social expectations are expected 
to be fulfilled.  
 
In the face of limited opportunities for legal migration paths, large numbers of young people 
not only dream of international migration but are also determined to make high-risk 
departures in multiple directions: towards Europe via Khartoum, the Sudan, crossing the 
Sahara desert, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea; towards the Middle East via Djibouti, 
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Somalia and Yemen by crossing the Red sea; towards South Africa by crossing several 
international borders (Asnake and Zerihun, 2015).  
 
This paper locates the study of migration brokering in a particularly complex Ethiopian socio-
historical, political, administrative and organizational structure of migration facilitation. 
Unlike the revolutionary socialist Derg regime (1974–1990) that curtailed labour exits, the 
current regime (1991 to date) has liberalized emigration policy in Ethiopia. Several 
proclamations and legal infrastructures have been developed to facilitate formal labour 
migrations from Ethiopia. The Overseas Employment Proclamation of 1998 resulted in the 
establishment of 400 Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). However, the licensing was 
limited to the Middle East countries. That left other significant labour migrations to the RSA, 
North Africa and Europe to facilitation by informal brokers1. There are thousands of informal 
brokers connected to villages across the country; who either recruit and connect migrants to 
formal labour recruitment agencies or facilitate overland irregular migrations (ILO, 2011; 
Abebaw, 2013; Fernandez, 2013; IOM, 2009). Some informal brokers supply migrants to both 
the formal agencies and informal brokers, though most of them work only with either of the 
two.  
 
The flow of Ethiopian migrants to the RSA started in the post-1991 context following 
significant political changes in both countries: the fall of the socialist government and 
liberalization of migration governance in Ethiopia, and the change of government and end of 
the Apartheid regime in the RSA (Habte, 2015; Teshome et al, 2013; IOM, 2009; Ephrem, 
2010). A decade ago an IOM report estimated that between 65,000 and 70,000 Ethiopians 
live in the RSA. Over 95% of these migrants entered the country through irregular means but 
immediately applied for asylum to regularize their situation (IOM, 2009; Girmachew, 2014). 
The same IOM report (2009)2, also estimated that between 17,000 and 20,000 male migrants 
from the Horn of Africa, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, arrive in the RSA annually, which 
shows the magnitude of the issue. Unofficial estimates by IOM staff at monitoring stations in 
Moyale suggest that roughly 60 people migrate towards RSA every day and 60% are from 
Hadya (pers. comm.). 
 
                                                          
1Even for the Middle East countries, when the services of legal overseas private employment 
agencies – such as finding employers, arranging travel documents or employment contracts, 
and organizing skills and language training before departure – became lengthy and costly, the 
informal brokers have become alternatives in organizing direct flights or overland journeys 
to destinations by informally using their connections (cf. De Regt and Tafesse, 2015).  
 
2 This report is 10 years old, but it is the most recent data that has attempted to estimate the number of 
Ethiopians that annually migrate to South Africa.   
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The majority of the Ethiopian migrant communities in the RSA are from two neighbouring 
administrative zones in Southern Ethiopia: Hadya and Kambata3 (IOM 2009). In these zones 
it is hardly possible to locate a village from where youths have not migrated to the RSA. A 
recent survey by Hadya Administrative Zone Labour and Social Affairs Office estimated that 
between 50,000 to 60,000 migrants from the zone live in the RSA. Many informants and 
growing literature reveal that the Hadya and Kambata migration to the RSA was noticed in 
the beginning of 2000s when then Ethiopian Ambassador to the RSA supported a few of his 
relatives from the same region to emigrate to the RSA (Ephrem, 2011; Girmachew, 2013; 
Teshome et al, 2015). This initial individual contribution and subsequent expanded networks, 
in conjunction with the involvement of smugglers and spread of success stories of prior 
migrants, eventually developed into a massive stream of migration to the RSA. 
 
Hadya and Kambata, with population densities of 342 and 502 persons per km2 respectively, 
are among the most densely populated areas in Ethiopia (CSA, 2007). As a result, shortage of 
agricultural land has been a serious challenge among the Hadya and Kambata ethnic groups 
for a long period of time (Girmachew, 2018). Rural-rural migration, particularly to labour 
intensive sugar plantations, had been their traditional livelihood coping mechanism (Kloos, 
1982). The government had also organized resettlement programmes for the two groups to 
land-abundant areas (Ephrem, 2010). The problem of land shortage or limited access to it 
affects young people more due to subdivisions of inherited land. Thus, migrants from Hadya 
are typically young males with no or low levels of education (e.g., Girmachew, 2018; Habte, 
2015).  
 
State restrictions on mobility and its consequences 
 
In 2013, the Government of Ethiopia banned all licensed Private Employment Agencies 
(PEAs). This was triggered by two incidents: 1) several dozen Ethiopian migrants were 
suffocated to death in 2012 en route to RSA in Tanzania;  2) Saudi Arabia deported more than 
163,000 undocumented Ethiopian migrants, mainly female domestic workers (Asnake and 
Zerihun, 2015). With increased media coverage of the death of Ethiopian migrants en route, 
abuses they endure at destinations mainly in the Gulf countries, and also when opposition to 
government was building momentum at home, the Ethiopian government responded by 
criminalizing informal brokers and banning all PEAs (De Regt and Tafesse, 2016).  
 
The state’s intensification of migration control and regulatory infrastructures always manifest 
itself through the criminalization of brokers and portrayal of migrants as victims of human 
trafficking practices. To that end, anti-human trafficking and smuggling legislations were 
adopted swiftly and “anti-human trafficking taskforces” have been established at all levels of 
the administrative tier with the aim of targeting the migration brokers. In order to broaden 
migration control activities, a joint anti-human trafficking committee was formed out of 
                                                          
3Hadya and Kambata are also names of ethnic groups residing in the two provinces respectively.  
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representatives of the law enforcement agencies along with religious and traditional leaders. 
Checkpoints have been set up in the main migration routes. Brokerage has been criminalized 
and brokers subjected to organized campaigns. As a result, hundreds of brokers have been 
convicted, and are currently serving long-term prison sentences4.  
 
Regardless of this, there has been a further rise in the migration of Ethiopian youth by using 
the services of informal brokers (De Regt and Tafesse, 2016; Girmachew, 2018; Ayalew, 
2018). However, the government has not been perceptive to the fact that the banning of 
licensed agents for several years has left informal brokers as the only alternative for potential 
migrants who are prepared to move at any cost. This paper shows that intensification of 
migration control structures and the absence of licensed employment agencies do not stop 
migration. Instead, they contribute to increases in the need for more inventive migration 
facilitation, raising the price of migration facilitation, attracting more actors including the law 
enforcement or the control actors themselves and increase the risk of migration.           
 
Assembling different components of the brokerage system 
 
Brokering (dilela) structure in Hadya 
 
Hadya has a well-established and dynamic system of migration brokerage that links villages 
and towns in Southern Ethiopia with chains of smugglers in transiting border towns and 
countries. This starts from Moyale across several countries of Eastern and Southern Africa up 
to the RSA. The structure and functioning of the migration industry is fluid and various 
assemblages have emerged in response to the policy environment as well as growing social 
networks with increasingly diverse actors. For example, the location of the lead broker5 is not 
fixed and he situates himself at a point between the place of departure and the destination 
depending on the ‘political’ situation. Until 2013, when the Government of Ethiopia started 
an organized campaign on ‘illegal’ brokers to combat “trafficking in persons and migrant 
smuggling”, most of the lead brokers had lived in Hossana, the capital of Hadya administrative 
zone, and Addis Ababa. Since then, some of them have been imprisoned, and others went 
underground by changing their places of residence. Some moved to the transit countries from 
where they facilitated the mobility of the Hadya migrants. From those transnational locations 
they continued to provide services including organizing supply and departures from places of 
origin and arranging clandestine journeys with the involvement of their chains at several 
                                                          
4 In the last years the Ethiopian government’s efforts were also backed up by the EU’s externalization of 
border controls (Gaibazzi, Bellagamba and Dünnwald, 2017: 5-10), which is noticeable in the northwestern 
route that leads to Europe. 
5 Our informants, including brokers, believe that there have been around 20 lead brokers in Hadya/Kambata 
since brokering to RSA has become noticeably important and about five of them are very successful. Success is 
measured by the number of people they safely sent out, which is of course a main factor to continue to 
operate in the field.      
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conjunction points. They also organized money transfers to these several nodes along the 
route of the long overland journey to RSA.  
The lead broker has several suppliers (akirabiwoch) or collectors (sebsabiwoch) at his 
command who are paid a commission per aspiring migrant that they supply. The main role of 
suppliers/collectors is to put the potential migrants in contact with the lead broker either in 
person or by phone. These are civil servants, teachers, contractors, traders or even church 
officials. In the face of stiff competition between lead brokers, the suppliers may also play the 
role of building the reputation of the lead broker in the area by communicating his success 
stories. However, different from the state’s accusation of the brokers “luring innocent 
migrants into exploitative situations” (Lindquist, 2012), we did not find evidence that they 
sought to persuade potential migrants to migrate. The risks of migration to South Africa are 
well known in the community as it is an established route. The decision to migrate is thus 
consciously made by weighing up the potential risks along the route and the socio-political 
situation in the RSA, including xenophobia, which are well known almost among all aspiring 
migrants and their respective families. Indeed, in this situation, providing migrants with false 
information and persuading them to migrate might not be credible given the presence of 
thousands of deportees and returnees in Hadya Zone. In such a risky journey, potential 
migrants and their families would double check the accuracy of information. 
 
Successful brokerage is determined by the lead broker’s ability to establish a structure of 
‘supply’ at the place of origin and the ability to establish strong networks with hard-working, 
smart and trustworthy individual smugglers along the transit route, based at each important 
point along the route. Petros is one of the well-known migration brokers in Hadya. He has 
served as a broker for over fifteen years. He even was detained for some time by “the anti-
Human Trafficking and Smuggling Command Post”. He claims to have successfully facilitated 
the migration of close to four thousand Ethiopians to the RSA, most of them from Hadya,.  
 
He started brokering in 2003 as a local supplier (aqirabi) for two lead brokers who lived in 
Addis Ababa, and were originally from Eritrea and Tigray6. Petros managed to graduate from 
migrant supplier to lead broker when he got an opportunity to meet Gebremeskel, another 
Eritrean broker who was based in Nairobi Airport facilitating transit migration of Ethiopians, 
Eritreans and Somalis to the RSA. Gebremeskel was part of an ‘effective’ brokerage network 
in the aviation industry from Addis Ababa Airport to the airports in the RSA.  
 
As Gebremeskel’s specialization was mainly in the facilitation of those who travelled by plane, 
he introduced Petros to four Ethiopian smugglers based in Kenya for overland journey 
facilitation at transit points in Nairobi and Mombasa. Back from Nairobi, Petros travelled to 
                                                          
6 Up to the early 2000s most of the brokers in Ethiopia were Tigreans, Eritreans and Somalis. The three share 
experiences of longstanding civil war and forced displacements and migrations. That led to the domination of 
the domain of migration facilitation by the members of the three groups.   
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Moyale at the Ethiopia-Kenya border where he met two established smugglers who 
facilitated border crossings and arranged transportation between Moyale and Nairobi for 
migrants. Gebremeskel and the Ethiopian smugglers based in Nairobi had already established 
chains in Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. Situated at each node, these smugglers 
(ashagariwoch, literally those who help to cross a river or a border) enable southward 
mobility of irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa.  
 
The fact that most of the migrants from Hadya to the RSA are not or little educated and do 
not speak any of the languages spoken en route make the services of the smugglers 
indispensable. Interestingly, however, none of the six brokers (including the lead) we 
interviewed in Hadya and Moyale had gone beyond grade eight in their level of education, 
which put the brokers at the same educational level as those to whom they provide services 
(cf. IOM, 2009). Except a few suppliers, most of the lead brokers at place of origin and the 
smugglers en route are male. One exceptionally famous woman broker, who ran away to 
Nairobi when the organized campaign was launched against brokers five years ago, was 
caught by the Government of Kenya and repatriated to Ethiopia where she is serving a long 
prison sentence7. In Hadya women’s roles in migration facilitation are mainly “home-based” 
as recruiters and as trusted third parties to hold the payment for brokers to be paid at 
different stages of the migrants’ journey. Their duties are therefore in keeping with 
traditional gender roles while the men do the main, outside work. Women can also be part 
of the support system for brokers in transit towns such as Moyale, where they cook food for 
the migrants while they are waiting until their further journey is organized by the smugglers.   
 
Two issues are very crucial in the brokerage structure. Firstly, there is a degree of 
changeability in the structure of the network in terms of the mode of operation and the 
individuals working within the network in response to regulatory policies. The membership 
works as far as there is activity going on in the network. Individuals based at any node in the 
network are free to work with any chief broker as long as they are contacted and supplied 
with migrants. Secondly, individual brokers situated at the important points in the route have 
their own local structures and personnel with specific jobs, and they do not know the chief 
broker. Keeping one’s network secret is crucial as it can be easily taken over. As mentioned 
above, Petros took over the network of his bosses when he got the contact address of the 
smuggler in Nairobi. In his turn, Petros’ own network was partly taken over by a teacher who 
used to be his supplier when he was imprisoned by the anti-human trafficking command post. 
Competition, cooperation, suspicion and secrecy are important aspect of brokerage and the 
smuggling industry (see Alpes, 2012; Lindquist, 2012).    
  
Brokering is part of everyday life in Hadya 
                                                          
7 It is unusual for a woman to be at such a high rank in the migration industry. Her case is exceptional. She had 
an extended family of successful brokers behind her: her father was one of the first brokers in Kambata Zone; 
her brother was also a famous broker until he was detained in Tanzania; her brother in-law was a well-knnown 
broker in Hadya zone and he is also serving a prison sentence in Hossana.    
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In Hadya, migration brokerage is a socio-culturally embedded business. Brokers make money 
in migration facilitation by using their multiple relations – ethnic, clan, religious, geographical 
– with potential migrants and their families. Migration brokers live among the community, 
they worship with the community, and their children go to the same school as the children 
from the local community. They belong to the same local burial organization (idir). Thus, 
brokers at origin abide by local values and norms. The basis of the trust between the brokers 
and potential migrants is also embedded in these multiple relationships, community values 
and norms. Migration to South Africa is a long journey with a high risk of being intercepted 
and deported8. Thus, for potential migrants using the services of a broker with whom they 
share multiple relationships, and whom they believe will respect the local values and norms, 
is a strategy to reduce risks.  
 
Brokers will also go to great lengths to maintain trust and compensate failed migrations 
through their own resources as Petros narrates below,  
 
“Once 133 boys I sent at different times were deported all together. They were 
collected from several prisons in Tanzania and Malawi and transported back 
home. It was a tough moment for me. On their arrival, I asked famous elders, 
who represent the Hadya people and work as advisers to the zonal 
administration, to intervene. This was public. With the elders’ mediation, I paid 
back the money I received from the deportees by selling my house for two 
million birr…. the elders and the migrants themselves calculated [and 
considered] some of my expenses. 
 The above quotation shows that brokers will work hard and use their own money to mitigate 
migration failures as this impacts on their reputation. 
 
If disputes between brokers and migrants arise, village elders, religious leaders and 
traditional authorities (such as clan representatives) are important in customary dispute 
resolution in communities such as Hadya. Resolving disputes in relation to migration is just 
treated as part of the customary system of conflict resolution. This is also the reason why 
migrants prefer and trust local brokers from the same village, hometowns, common religion 
and ethnic groups instead of using the services of a stranger in a distant land.  
 
Elders are the most trustworthy migration mediators (asmami) between the potential 
migrants and the brokers even before departure. They mediate negotiations of brokerage 
price. Contrary to other routes, potential migrants from Hadya to South Africa negotiate 
                                                          
8 Between June and December 2018, two rounds of deportations of Ethiopian migrants, who were intercepted 
by border guards along the migration route to South Africa, took place with the support of IOM. In June and 
October 2018, 300 and 67 migrants respectively were deported, and most of them were from Hadya  (See 
www.iom.int/news/iom-facilitates-return-300-stranded-ethiopia-migrants-tanzania; www.iom.int/news/iom-
helps-67-ethiopian -stranded-migrants-return-tanzania.).  
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payment straight from Hadya to South Africa, not step by step910. It seems that every aspiring 
migrant has one grand plan, which is arriving in South Africa. In this situation, migrants who 
migrate without their extended families’ approval, and as a result might approach less known 
and cheaper brokers, risk compromising the chance of getting their money back in the case 
of failed journeys or deportation. When the migrants are deported, it is difficult for them to 
claim their money back from the brokers who are not socially tied to the local norms. The 
case of Madabo, a deportee from Malawi, exemplifies this: 
 
“My father and mother passed away when I was in grade five. When I reached grade 7, when 
all my school friends left for South Africa, I asked my brother to help me to go. He told me 
that he would not let me go, citing my excellent performance at school. I had always stood 
number one in my class. My brother was a teacher and works far away from our home area... 
I sold crops, goats and bulls, and managed to collect 100,000 birr [by then around 4000 USD]. 
I called a broker on a number I got from a friend. He told me the price and to come to 
Hawassa. I met him at a bus station in Hawassa city and discussed about the routes, and paid 
him 80,000 birr... I was caught in Malawi and deported back after spending four months in 
prison... Since I did not know the broker, I could not trace him at all when I arrived back here. 
I tried to call him on his phone number but the line was no more in service.” 
   
The extract shows that local social capital is as important as transnational networks in making 
the migration project successful. Madabo disappointedly told us that while some of his 
friends who retrieved part of their money tried out another round and succeeded in reaching 
the destination, his ended there.  Such stories of migration without local social 
embeddedness are not common in Hadya. Yet, this type of grim story often paves the way 
for the emergence of images of ‘bad’ brokers who do not show accountability to their clients 
when they are in crisis. These stories are usually emphasized in the state discourses 
broadcasted by media. Unfortunately, many academic publications in Ethiopia have followed 
the same path (Abebebaw, 2013; Triulzi and Mckenzie, 2013; Hailemichael, 2014; Habte, 
2015; Shewit, 2015; Zeyneba, 2016). Such research shows a lack of the understanding of the 
dynamism of the organization of migration facilitation at the place of origin.   
          
Contrary to the media-created image of the ‘heartless’ broker exploiting their migrant-
victims, our findings show that brokers perform traditional male protector roles. For instance, 
Petros and other brokers repeatedly visited the family of the deceased when migrants who 
used their service of facilitation had passed away en route. In such instances, it has been a 
common norm to return the full amount of money paid for the facilitation of migration. Thus, 
                                                          
9 In the northwest route, migrants negotiate payment first to Khartoum. Further journey is planned from 
Khartoum. In the eastern route migrants also first negotiate either up to Djibouti, Yemen, Puntland or Hargeissa, 
from where the next step is planned.  
 
10 Usually in Hadya payments are made in three stages.  The first stage is paid before departure, and the 
remaining is deposited with the elders who release it on the authorization of the family members based on the 
progress report of the migrant. Usually, the second stage is paid when the migrant arrives in Nairobi and the 
third is when the migrant is about to leave Malawi or Mozambique for the destination.   
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the kind of relationship between the potential migrants, their extended family members and 
the migration brokers in Hadya is not a mere business engagement. Rather, it is embedded 
in existing socio-cultural relationships. Both sides count on the multiple fields of interaction. 
For example, for the potential migrants and their families, these multiple relationships 
consolidate trust in the brokers. For the brokers it situates them within the local population 
giving them a market and protection against risk at the same time.  
    
However, the fact that the brokerage service functions within the existing socio-cultural 
relation does not contradict the competitiveness of the service as a “business”. Brokers’ 
successes also depend on their reputation as effective brokers – their success stories.  A 
straight answer from potential migrants to a question, “What kind of broker do you prefer?” 
is the one who effectively takes them to their destination. In other words, potential migrants 
and their families look for an effective and efficient broker. As a result, brokers invest in 
building their personal reputation as effective, generous and trustworthy individuals11. In 
the long quotation at the beginning of this paper, a broker named Dagim, “even helped some 
deportees to remigrate without demanding additional payment”. This information about the 
generosity of Dagim has been spread throughout Hadya province. It is part of building one’s 
reputation. Every broker works hard to keep his or her reputation high in the community, 
which demands increasing one’s rate of success. Petros said, 
 
“If people lose confidence in me, I lose all my market. The source dries up, and then 
others will take over. Every broker works to win the competition.”  
A single failure, such as reports of abuse of their clients en route; repetitive deportation of 
clients and failure to treat those deported properly could cause the “source” to dry up12.           
Our data from Hadya is rich in examples of brokers who failed to maintain their reputations 
after they became famous. Thus, at the place of origin a chief broker must subscribe to the 
local norms and values, and at the same time work effectively to build and maintain his/her 
reputation. Next, we will discuss how migration facilitation functions in religious institutions. 
 
Migration facilitations and Churches 
 
Close to 89% of the Hadya population are Christians of different categories, with Evangelical 
Protestants constituting over 75% (CSA, 2012). Churches contribute to migration facilitation 
through their prayer programmes and institutionally by arranging exchange programmes 
with churches in Southern African countries. For instance, priests/pastors usually pray for 
potential migrants to succeed in their aspiration to migrate to South Africa; they prophesize 
                                                          
11 A story of a famous Hadya broker who allowed his client to try out his chance three times without additional 
costs has spread throughout Hadya. This broker, living in Addis Ababa with many investments in Hosanna, is 
known by nearly everyone.   
12  For Petros, the source is where he gets aspiring migrants. If his reputation is damaged, no one comes to him 
to look for his service and the source will dry up.  
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over the life of individuals aspirants that their future will be great in South Africa. This gives 
hope and courage to potential migrants, and encourages them to take risks13. When 
potential migrants are about to start their journey, fellow Christians in the neighbourhood 
gather and pray for their success. The Church has a vested interest in endorsing migration as 
successful migrants remit money to the churches and the churches publicly recognize 
receiving money from the migrants, giving thanks to the Almighty for their success in public.   
 
The church-migration nexus extends beyond Ethiopia. A number of churches have been 
established by migrants and brokers from Ethiopia in Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and 
RSA. Churches in Hadya train gospel choirs and pastors, and send them under exchange 
programmes to churches in Southern Africa that invite them by securing visas for religious 
purposes. Most of them overstay their visas. Migration is also contributing to the creation of 
a Hadya community in the major transit towns. For instance, in Moyale there is a growing 
Hadya population, and a church where most of the members are from Hadya. In 2017, a 
pastor originally from Hadya was fired from this church and accused of smuggling migrants. 
When he told me about this pastor, Towfiq (a migrant smuggler in Moyale who will be 
discussed later on) said:  
 
You see that big church. The pastor first contacted me and asked me to do him a 
favour. His family members came from Hadya to go to South Africa. He asked me 
how much they should pay, and if I can help him. He paid me, and I processed his 
relatives’ migration. I did this several times for him. After a while, he asked me for 
a commission. I paid him 1000 birr per person for those who came through him. 
He gradually started brokerage, and we were working together. Last year his 
congregation learnt that he is a broker, and they expelled him from the church. 
Now, I don’t know where he is. 
According to informants, government intelligence officials had put pressure on the church 
administration to fire him. He was accused of receiving Hadya migrants and hosting them, 
sometimes using the church buildings for accommodation, and smuggling them to Kenya.  In 
engaging in migration facilitation, the church officials also have multiple interests: they have 
kin members who want to migrate; they sympathize with members of their congregations; 
they have interests in expanding their religion; they have financial interests. Other research 
also analyses the role of church in migration. Hagan and Ebaugh’s (2003) study of Mayas from 
Guatemala in Texas found that religion and the church play an important role in decision-
making, preparing for the journey and after arrival.  These involvements of different 
categories of the population make migration facilitation a community enterprise rather than 
a business run by independent criminal networks alone. 
                                                          
13 The Ethiopian government has warned church leaders to stop the prayers and prophecies. 
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Self-representation and others’ presentations of brokers 
 
When he appeared before the court accused of “human trafficking and smuggling in 
persons”, Petros did not express any guilt. Instead, he presented himself as a hero who gave 
service to his community members who wanted to improve their lives. He mentioned the 
number of Hadya ‘boys’ he supported in migratin to RSA whose lives have now been changed 
for the better14. The Hadya diaspora in the RSA, who are the result of this irregular migration, 
have been contributing to local development. Petros asked the judge, “Was Hossana the 
same city few years back?”… “Whose contribution was that?” Until Petros was ordered by 
the judge to stop, he attempted to deconstruct the state’s discourses of criminalization of the 
brokers responsible for migrants’ vulnerability by emphasizing his contribution to the people 
who were attending the hearing that day.    
  
Petros used the court as a forum to present his contributions to his people and show where 
his legitimacy lies. He knew this could be the only opportunity for him to defend himself and 
argue against the state’s positions. Unlike migration organizations (see Akesson and Alpes, 
2018), individual migration brokers of irregular migrants often keep their work underground 
and they get legitimacy from their clients due to the effectiveness of their work without any 
public self representations. However, in this situation Petros was already caught by a law 
enforcement body and he was presented before the judge.  
 
Hossana has changed very fast, which everyone attributes to the remittance flow from RSA. 
This is especially true of service sectors such as hotels, bus transportation and the banking 
industry, which have visibly improved as compared to other towns in the region. All 
commercial banks opened branches to benefit from remittance flows and money transfers 
from migrants. Hossana municipality officials also occasionally visit the Hadya diaspora in RSA 
to ask them for financial contributions to development activities back home. Beyond 
remitting to their family, the Hadya migrants in RSA contribute to their original 
neighbourhoods in multiple ways. For instance, migrants remit money to cover expenses for 
the annual bull slaughtering festival, showing they are still connected to their communities’ 
customs. They also get transnational blessings from people gathered there. Similarly, 
migrants cover burial expenses and contribute money for marriages. It is public knowledge 
that these migrants were sent out by migration brokers. As a result, among the Hadya 
population, contrary to the statist labelling of brokers as human traffickers and the 
subsequent aggressive criminalizing campaigns (Alpes, 2013), the local discourses recognize 
the brokers’ positive contribution. Among these recognitions is the nickname of “Berri 
kefach” which literally translates to “door openers”15. Our Hadya informants were clear that 
                                                          
14 Interview with the Hadya Zone Judge, May 2018 
15 The nick name “Berri kefach” has been given previously to very few famous individuals who have greatly 
contributed to the development of the Hadya people. For instance, individuals who had contributed to the 
establishment of the first school, the first hospital and the first road had secured the nickname.   
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the alternative to irregular migration is domestic migration to labour intensive sugar 
plantations and to urban constructions sites. When seen in that context, successful 
transnational migration to RSA is a big opportunity. And in calling the brokers “Berri kefach”, 
the Hadya population is recognizing the crucial role brokers play in opening such 
opportunities, which attests to Petros’s arguments cited above.  
 
“Getting online”: Exit, transportation and arrival in Moyale 
 
The modes of transport organised by brokers have changed in response to the hardening of 
state policy. Instead of transporting migrants in groups using mini busses as they used to do, 
brokers in Hadya inform their clients, like Dawit, to just ‘get online’. This means they should 
take public transport and travel to Moyale, the border town. Using public transportation 
“they just travel as citizens in their own country”, as Petros told us, making it difficult for the 
anti-human trafficking command post to stop them at check-points16. “Get online” has thus 
become a key phrase for potential migrants and brokers in Hadya. For the migrants from 
Hadya who speak neither of the local languages, Moyale is just a ‘foreign’ land and their 
arrival, accommodation and arrangement of further journey depends on the smugglers. On 
top of that, the population of Moyale have constructed the identity of the Hadya migrants as 
uneducated rural boys migrating to South Africa carrying money. According to Tofiq, who is 
one of the brokers in Moyale,  
 
“The youth you see on the street just waits to steal from Hadya migrants. They 
are uneducated rural boys. They lack confidence. Even small boys scare them.  
That is why we send our boys to collect them from mini-buses and buses before 
they enter the town.” 
This precarious situation makes them vulnerable to risks and highly dependent on the 
smugglers. This has been confirmed by a number of interviews with deportees in Hadya. 
Among them, Madabo witnessed that, “...when I got out of the bus, local youth started to 
chase me. I did not know which direction to run, but luckily a guy sent by the broker to collect 
me was already there and he called me by my name. According to the migrants, the youth in 
Moyale just rob them if they find them ‘unattended’ by the smugglers. In the last two years, 
Moyale has been hit by protracted inter-communal conflicts, and the government’s presence 
has been weak. In this situation, the jobless youth even established informal ‘checkpoints’ 
and collect revenue from those boys (buustuu, meaning those who unload), who receive 
Hadya migrants from public transport mostly on the outskirts of Moyale17. Thus, in this 
situation smugglers play a role of protecting the migrants in a vulnerable situation.  
                                                          
16 Except the route from Wallo to the Djibouti border where there is no public transportation, transporting 
migrants en masse by a rented car up to the border has been more or less abandoned. 
17 Interestingly, migrants from other parts of the country do not need that protection as they can articulately 
defend themselves. 
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Smuggling18 infrastructure at Ethiopia-Kenya border  
 
The main smuggler in the transit place is the one who communicates with the lead broker – 
the one who sends out migrants from place of origin – and receives payments from him for 
the facilitation. He oversees all the activities including documentations (such as accessing 
vaccination certificate), helps them at immigration offices, border crossings and 
transportation up to the next node, i.e., Nairobi. Under the main smuggler, there are several 
lower level “smuggling boys” (ijoolle nama ceesisttu, literally boys who help people to cross) 
with specific jobs. These include receiving migrants on arrival and getting them 
accommodation, organizing documentation including vaccination certificates, and arranging 
border crossing and transportation. They are not necessarily young boys in terms of age; 
rather they work for the main smuggler since they do not have their own long distance 
network. Each of the main smugglers has several “smuggling boys” facilitating these 
processes. For each task there is a fixed rate at a certain moment. For example, boys who 
receive migrants from the bus station and arrange accommodation are paid 300 birr (10.7 
USD) per person; those who take migrants to immigration offices get 200 birr (7 USD) per 
person, a transporter who takes migrants across the border by motor bike gets 300 birr per 
person, and a border guard gets 200 birr per person.     
  
Migration facilitation actors working in these networks are people from various backgrounds. 
They include civil servants, drivers (of buses, mini buses, Bajaj auto-rickshaws, motor bikes), 
traders, jobless youth, workers in hotels (from the manager to the janitors), workers in 
churches and mosques, immigration officials and border guards; they are all part of as well 
as beneficiaries of the migration industry. They are assembled due to their common goal – 
supporting the migrants’ mobility. However, internally, their interests might vary from those 
“motivated by pursuit of financial gains” (Hernandez Leon, 2009: 154) to loyalty based on 
social relations such as ethnicity, religion, language and belonging to a certain locality. 
Indeed, in Moyale inhabitants can identify the ethnic identity of the migrants from the 
identity of the smuggler they use.  
     
However, similar to the place of origin, smugglers at transit points also have to work hard to 
accomplish their duty and satisfy the clients. Failure to perform properly may result in “going 
out of business”. Concerning this, Tofiq said, “If that broker [for instance, the lead broker in 
Hadya] loses confidence in me, he looks for another more effective one, which means I will 
be going out of business”. Comparing the concerns of the two brokers featuring in this paper 
– Petros, who is based at place of origin and Towfiq, who is based at transit –  both work hard 
to satisfy their clients. Petros lives within the migrant sending community and his 
commitment is to the broader clients (migrants, their extended families, the mediating elders 
                                                          
18 In this paper ‘brokers’ have been used to refer to the actors in a wider infrastructure of migration facilitation 
including those involved in recruiting, obtaining documents, organizing departures, arranging transportation, 
etc. In the context of border town, we use smugglers to refer to those actors who support migrants endeavor 
to cross international border irregularly.  
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and the church community), while Towfiq frames his task narrowly in terms of satisfying the 
lead broker who sends migrants from place of origin.  
“Passport” and “Fax”: Migrants’ “legality” and “illegality” in 
Moyale 
 
Smugglers divide migrants into two categories: migrants with passports and migrants without 
passports called ‘fax’ migrants19. Next, we will discuss the smuggling processes of the two 
categories.   
 
Migrants with Passport - “Legal” migrants 
 
Migrants arriving in Moyale holding a passport first apply to the Ethiopian Immigration Office 
to get an ‘exit stamp’ or immigration clearance to travel to Kenya. The immigration officials 
ask them why they are travelling to Kenya and who their contact person there is. This is a 
tough and inconvenient encounter for Hadya migrants who are perceived by the public, the 
law enforcement and the immigration officials as people migrating to South Africa. In other 
words, in Moyale the Hadya migrants’ mobility is constructed, without exception, as 
migration to South Africa. This, of course, makes border-crossing and travel within Kenya 
difficult for the Hadya migrants different from other Ethiopians, which increases the 
importance of smugglers in making their migration possible.  
 
The “smuggling boys” guide them to the immigration office and advise them how to perform 
well in the interview. More importantly, every main smuggler has his ‘own persons’ in the 
immigration office. Towfiq narrated the process,  
 
“I call the immigration officials and inform them that these are my children. Then 
the officials stamp for them and keep records of their number, and I will settle 
the payment later on… I usually pay them 300 birr [11 USD] per person. The 
Ethiopian side is ok. The officials are very good…”  
After securing exit clearance from Ethiopian Immigration, migrants go to the Kenyan 
Immigration office, some three hundred meters walk southward, separated by two check-
points – Ethiopian and Kenyan. Ethiopians do not require an entry visa for a short visit to 
Kenya, and can enter with only an ‘entry stamp’ on their passport. However, getting the entry 
permit especially for travellers from Hadya/ Kambata is only possible through the smugglers’ 
                                                          
19 The analogy with “fax” can be understood in contrast to procedure of sending mail through a post office in 
Ethiopia. In the case of the former an office manager sends a fax to a certain destination just from his/her office. 
In the latter case, one has to go to post office, communicate with the workers there, pay and submit their mail. 
Similarly, for migrants without passport, a smuggler organizes transportation without undergoing the 
bureaucratic procedure at immigration office and seeking documents, which migrants with a passport have to 
undergo. 
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support. Similar to the Ethiopian Immigration Office, in the Kenyan Immigration Office there 
is a general perception that every Hadya/ Kambata passing through the border crossing heads 
to South Africa. This generalization is a result of a repeated interception of migrants from 
Hadaya/ Kambata in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. The Kenyan Immigration 
Office in Moyale has been instructed several times by the state not to issue the stamp for 
travellers from this particular region in Ethiopia. We could not confirm this, but regardless of 
whether that is true or false, the discourse itself is sufficient to construct migrant identities 
and a complex web of smuggling networks aligned to it (see Deshingkar, 2018).  
 
This vulnerability of the migrants increased the demand for more smuggling, resulting in the 
creation of another layer of smugglers in Moyale whose special expertise is dealing with 
Kenyan Immigration officials.  Towfiq further explains the procedure: 
  
“I don’t personally contact the Kenyan immigration officials. There are agents 
[of the Immigration Office]. I send codes of my clients to the agent… The agent 
sends that code to the officials working in the visa department. When my 
clients arrive, the officials check their passports against the code. I transfer to 
the agent around 30,000-35,000 shillings [equivalent to around 400 USD] per 
person based on our deal.”  
In October 2018, there were four ‘big’ smugglers called ‘agents’ in the Kenyan Immigration 
Office in Moyale, without whom smuggling of documented migrants through the Kenyan 
Immigration Office was nearly impossible. All other smugglers have to go through these four 
‘agents’, and if any smuggler in Moyale fails to approach them the only option is using “fax”. 
Therefore, there are several smugglers in Moyale who give service only to those who do not 
use the “legal” means to travel to Nairobi. Just in front of the Kenyan Immigration Office, a 
couple of boys sell vaccination certificates to the migrants. The certificate has been taken to 
Moyale from one of the hospitals in Addis Ababa. It costs between 300 and 600 birr 
[equivalent to between 10.7 and 21 USD] based on its availability on the market in Moyale20.  
  
The migrants’ status as documented travelers in Kenya ends when they arrive in Nairobi – a 
journey that only takes one day. The whole complex smuggling process in Moyale ensures 
safe travel to Nairobi, where other smugglers are waiting to organize further southward 
journeys for them.  The first duty of the smugglers who receive them at the bus station in 
Nairobi is to collect their passports and eliminate them. This is part of the deal between the 
‘agents’ and the Immigration Office in Moyale. The reason is that Kenyan police could 
recognize and detain the migrants regardless of them having permission to enter Kenya, and 
the Immigration Office in Moyale does not want them to be caught with the entry permit. In 
other words, after a single day of “legal” travel, the Hadya migrants’ status turns into ‘illegal’ 
aliens. Of course, when they leave Kenya and continue the clandestine journey southward, 
documents showing their Ethiopian identity are a liability to the migrants, and thus have to 
                                                          
20 For comparison, this costs just 22 birr in hospitals in Addis Ababa. But travelers can access the certificate 
formally only if they have visa, a system favoring the informal market. 
26 
 
be thrown away in any case.  This shows the failure of the statist discourse, which presents 
migrant status in dichotomy as “legal” and “illegal” or “regular” and “irregular” as a hard 
category, which in reality can change swiftly. Migrants also navigate various migration 
regimes along the route and constantly move between legality and illegality. The role of the 
Ethiopian and Kenyan immigration officials in the smuggling process also shows the ambiguity 
of the boundaries between migration facilitation and the domain of migration control, which 
the state and some scholars who emphasize individual human traffickers tend to ignore.     
 
“Fax” Migrants – Clandestine Journey 
 
For “fax” migrants’ – those who do not hold a passport – smugglers arrange accommodation 
in the hotels until their number reaches a threshold for transportation to Nairobi. In the 
meantime, they make necessary preparations including currency exchange and occasionally 
purchasing Kenyan SIM cards for them to communicate with their families, networks and 
smugglers while en route depending on the security situation.  
 
Crossing the border mainly takes place in two ways. Firstly, smuggling boys guide the migrants 
across the border at night. Secondly, smuggling boys transport the migrants across the border 
by using motor bikes with the knowledge of the border guards. Rates of payments are 
meticulously put in place so that the border guards just count the number of smuggled 
persons across the border and claim their payments when it is convenient.      
 
There are two routes for migrants’ clandestine journey to Nairobi based on the security 
situation and the ethnic identity of the lead smuggler and transporter. The first one, which is 
favoured by most smugglers, goes through the Eastern province – Moyale – Marsabit – Isiolo 
– Nairobi. It is preferred by all non-Somali smugglers and transporters21. This route has better 
infrastructure with asphalt roads. The second route is in the Somali inhabited Northeastern 
province – Moyale – Wajir – Isiolo – Nairobi. Most of the road is rough gravel. 
 
Ethnicity is an important factor in the selection of the route for smugglers and transporters. 
This is because law enforcement bodies with whom transporters and smugglers negotiate if 
they are intercepted belong to the inhabitants of the provinces. Language proficiency and 
belonging are social capitals that smugglers make use of during negotiations. Most of the 
transporters between Moyale and Nairobi speak either Somali and/or Oromo; both languages 
are also widely spoken in Ethiopia. This indicates that smuggling is embedded in and functions 
with cross border ethnic, economic and social relations in the area.   
 
The transportation systems have been changed from trucks and containers to pickup-trucks, 
as they allow the transporters to flexibly change routes or detour into the bushes when they 
                                                          
21  Population on this route from Moyale to Isiolo, which is 500 kilometers long, is inhabited by the Oromo. The 
ongoing conflict in Moyale is between the Oromo and Somalis, thus the Somali smugglers and transporters 
prefer the northeastern route to avoid the Oromo inhabited areas.  
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face unfavourable check points and towns. They are less risky than trucks and containers, in 
which migrants have suffocated in the past. After Moyale, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and 
Lilongwe are very popular points of assemblage where smugglers are concentrated, arranging 
clandestine accommodation and transportation, and facilitating communications and money 
transfers. With smooth and fast money transfer systems, Kenya is also a centre where the 
bribing of officials and law enforcement are organized (detail of this will be discussed under 
technological infrastructure).  
 
Potential migrants are usually given the opportunity to choose between the “sea route”, 
“land route” or “half-sea and half-land route” as part of the deal with the brokers before 
departure. There are different prices for each of these routes. However, in reality the choice 
of route is made by smugglers in Kenya after assessing the “safety” of the routes. They then 
force migrants to obey their decision, though changing route is a common practice that 
usually results in arguments between migrants and their transporters. In Kenya and Tanzania, 
pastoralists, farmers and unemployed youth stop migrants en route and demand payments. 
But unlike the popular portrayal of migrant-broker relations, holding migrants hostage and 
forcing families back home to transfer ransom was not reported. Perhaps this is due to the 
fact that the actors are local inhabitants rather than organized criminal gangs, different from 
Libya or Yemen (Triulzi, 2013; Abebaw, 2013). Migrant transporters, who belong to the 
localities act as trouble shooters bribing any troublemaker along the trail.   
 
 
Most of the returnees and deportees we interviewed had spent some time in refugee camps 
either in Malawi or Mozambique. Confirming Dawit’s story quoted at the beginning, Tadesse 
gave us the account below. Tadesse was a former migrant from Hadya who became one of 
the successful brokers. Tadesse started smuggling in Malawi, where his friend was serving as 
a smuggler. He returned from RSA and then moved to Tanzania and Kenya before finally 
ending up back in Hadya. According to Tadesse, 
      
“Kaka Refugee Camp in Malawi was an ideal place to put migrants temporarily. It was 
located immediately before a very difficult checkpoint. The camp officials would not 
prohibit the newly arriving migrants to reside there and apply for asylum…  However, 
Lilongwe Refugee Camp was a more comfortable camp for migrants to stay for a while 
since there were good facilities and the officials were also friendly and were very 
familiar with the business.” 
 
The account indicates the overlapping and shifting roles of various elements of the migration 
industry, and how smugglers navigate this to facilitate migration. While the states work with 
international humanitarian organizations such as the IOM to transport intercepted migrants 
back home, the smugglers also use humanitarian organizations who run refugee camps for 
smuggling purposes. In other words, the humanitarian industry at the same time works both 
to control and facilitate migrants’ mobility (Schapendonk, 2018). It is the interplay of these 
actors and their roles that shapes and sustains human mobility from Ethiopia in the face of 
the state’s (at least officially) and other stakeholders’ intensified efforts to curtail mobility.   
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Money transfer and communication infrastructures in Moyale 
 
The border town is perhaps the most crucial place in irregular migration generally, and the 
migration industry in particular. With its multiple institutions, which are aimed at controlling 
mobility, one would say that borders present barriers to mobility (Fernandez Leon, 2008). To 
the contrary, border towns are the most important places where irregular migration is being 
facilitated. Of course, the multiple existing institutions of control are counteracted by the 
high concentration of migration facilitators.  They are further hindered by the very fluid 
relationship between the control and facilitation industries they create through the 
relationship between the smugglers and immigration officials in Moyale.  
Communication infrastructure and resource flows (money transfer) are the two crucial 
infrastructures in the facilitation of irregular migration. Ethiopia has a single telecom 
company monopolized by the state. It does not work beyond the national borders of the 
country. Similarly, Ethiopia has a very tight financial system where money transfer by citizens 
from the country to the outside world is almost impossible. Given the chronic shortage of 
foreign currencies Ethiopia is facing, it is even difficult to access foreign currencies in the 
financial industry. There is actually no formal mechanism of trading Ethiopian Birr for Kenyan 
Shillings or Sudanese Pounds and vice versa. Formal businesses take US Dollars, which are 
extremely scarce. On the other hand, in the border towns of East Africa, currencies of the 
neighbouring countries are exchanged informally but publicly in the streets and in shops.  
 
Within this ostensibly tight environment, migration facilitators have innovatively established, 
diverse and dynamic strategies of money transfer and payment systems that operate in 
different locations such as places of origin, transit and destinations. The specific operations 
of the money transfer systems vary from one route to another mainly depending on the 
geographical distance and business relations between the source of migrants and 
destinations. For instance, money transfer between Ethiopia and Gulf countries is embedded 
in imports, exports and remittance flows. In the southern route— where there is very little 
import and export between Ethiopia and South Africa and migrants cross several countries 
that use different currencies— money transfer involves informal hawalas, aviation staff and 
mobile banking from the border towns where the Kenyan system can be used. 
 
The communication and financial systems at the border are very crucial as they instantly 
respond to potential risks en route, which usually need urgent interventions. Unlike Ethiopia, 
Kenya is a liberal country with several telecom companies, most of them operating in Eastern 
and Southern African countries. Comparatively, Kenya has also advanced systems of financial 
transfer. M-PESA, a Kenyan based mobile banking service – transfer and deposit – has been 
very effective since 2007 in Kenya and Tanzania, and later expanded to the RSA. Situated at 
critical points on the route, smugglers exploit transnational opportunities and enable 
migrants to circumvent layers of migration control to navigate the complex and risky mobility 
landscape. Petros’s account exemplifies this,  
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“One day because the land route in Tanzania was full of uncertainties, my people 
decided to use a boat from Mombasa to Mozambique. Unfortunately, just two hours 
after they started the journey, I heard they were intercepted. Dr. Tekle22 gave me a 
call and told me the bad news. I was very sad. I told him to do whatever he could. 
Dr. Tekle was very smart. I transferred money to Sisay23 in Moyale who immediately 
wired it to Dr. Tekle. Though a lot of money was paid, he settled the problem in a 
few hours. They were freed and continued their journey.”          
 
This extract reveals how communication technology allowed a broker in a remote town in 
Ethiopia to follow up his clients on a journey on Indian Ocean. It shows how the interplay of 
infrastructures such as commercial banking for money transfers from Hadya to Moyale, 
mobile money transfers from Moyale to Mombasa, the ease of communication, and the 
effective use of migration infrastructure that helped circumvent the mobility control regimes.  
 
Language barriers are broken by the presence of networks of multilingual smugglers at 
important nodes. Petros completed only primary school and speaks only two local Ethiopian 
languages (Hadyigna and Amharic), while people in his smuggling network speak several 
languages crucial for the facilitation of migrants’ mobility – Oromo, Somali, Kiswahili, English, 
etc.  Thus, with the flow of migrants to RSA, smugglers from Hadya have been placed at the 
crucial nodes either as lead smugglers or as assistants, facilitating communication between 
migrants, brokers/smugglers and other mediators. 
 
Thus, technological infrastructure (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014), mainly communication and 
money transfer, are the most crucial elements in the facilitation of migrants’ clandestine 
mobility. Smugglers’ innovative use of the technological infrastructure “entangled with the 
wider web of relations” (Schapendonk, 2018: 665) shape the clandestine mobility across 
nation-states and risky landscape.       
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examined how the interplay between the complex assemblage of a dynamic 
relationship between migration facilitation, the domain of control and humanitarian regimes 
shape migrants’ mobility from Ethiopia to South Africa. By taking into account the social and 
cultural conditions that shape the migration industry in general, and brokering practices in 
particular, we shed light on the workings and dynamics of contemporary irregular migration 
processes in Ethiopia.  
                                                          
22 Dr. Tekle was one of Petros’s ‘people’‘based in Nairobi and Mombasa. He is Ethiopian and has now left 
Kenya for one of the Western countries. 
 
23 Sisay was a smuggler working with Petros’ based in Moyale.  
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Contrary to the official hegemonic statist discourse, the actors are not just specialized 
professional smugglers, but also ordinary individuals, government officials, law enforcement 
agents, and migrants’ families and friends in the place of origin and abroad. It involves 
complex social relations, access to communication technologies and flow of information, and 
formal and informal money transfer agents. Brokers play a crucial role in creating this 
“complex web of relations in which different actors liaise” (Schapendonk, 2018: 663) and 
shape a migrant’s mobility in this complex environment. As Jill Alpes correctly says, 
understanding this situation necessitates seeing the role of brokerage as an entry point, and 
examines the wider organizational logic of migration rather than narrowing it to the 
relationship between brokers and migrants (Alpes, 2013).  
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